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THE USES OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE LAW: A CLINICAL VIEW OF 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY. By Walter Bromberg. Westport, Conn.: 
Quorum Books. 1979. Pp. x, 442. $25. 
In The Uses of Psychiatry in the Law, Walter Bromberg surveys 
with apparent approval the current relationship between law and 
psychiatry, disciplines which share the "common aim of attempting 
to manage human misbehavior" (p. 3). The book uncritically de-
scribes relevant case law and psychological data as well as Brom-
berg's own forty years of clinical experience. Bromberg's perspective 
is colored by his confidence in the validity of psychiatric categoriza-
tion of behavior. He assumes that psychiatrists are in the legal pro-
cess to stay, and his discussion of the many important issues 
concerning use of psychiatric information in the judicial system con-
sistently, albeit implicitly, favors a broad psychiatric role. 
The book is organized around the various areas of law to which 
psychiatry is regularly applied, including defenses of insanity and 
diminished capacity, issues of mental competency, violent and sex-
ual crimes, and child custody. Within each area, Bromberg discusses 
legal and psychiatric developments and how they have interacted to 
expand or limit the psychiatrist's role. He provides clear explana-
tions of the concepts involved, a surprisingly thorough review of the 
case law, and a careful analysis of the difficulties involved in trans-
lating psychiatric concepts into legal principles. 
Bromberg's exploration of the limitations of psychiatric thinking, 
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however, inadequately responds to the most fundamental concerns 
of those who caution against extensive application of psychiatry to 
legal problems.1 Doubts about the validity of psychiatric findings 
probably explain much of the judicial reluctance to accept psychiat-
ric evidence and categorizations. As Chief Justice Burger suggested 
in an article prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court: "[at] 
best psychiatry is now an infant among the family of sciences. . . . 
[Psychiatrists] may be claiming too much in relation to what they 
really understand about the human personality and human behav-
ior."2 Similar doubts have been expressed by other writers.3 
While Bromberg recognizes these doubts in situations where psy-
chiatrists attempt to predict dangerousness, he seems to assume that 
similar problems do not plague attempts to characterize past mental 
states, decisions regarding what environment is in "the best interest" 
of the child, and other difficult areas. Such an assumption seems 
unfounded: the impediments to successful prediction of dangerous-
ness may also limit the accuracy of psychiatric evidence in other ar-
eas. Ennis's ·and Litwack's comprehensive study of psychiatric 
evaluations indicated that "[h]uman behavior is difficult to under-
stand, and, at present, impossible to predict."4 They found that psy-
chiatric judgments can be colored by, among other things, 
socioeconomic factors, personal biases, and institutional contexts 
(i.e., the training of the psychiatrist and the context of the evalua-
tion). The effect of these biases may be particularly important be-
cause of the ambiguity of psychiatric data. 5 Bromberg does not 
explain why these barriers to accurate psychiatric evidence are con-
fined to predictions of dangerousness. On the contrary, his response 
to these concerns is at times flippant; he refers to one writer's state-
ment that the transcript in the Jack Ruby trial "screams out . . . the 
clarion message that psychiatric testimony should never be permitted 
in the courtroom" as "shrill" (p. 123), and he characterizes a judge's 
suggestion that "psychiatry [is] an empirical and speculative science 
with rather elastic notation and terminology which is usually wise 
after the event" as "testy" (p. 350). 
1. See generally T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC SLAVERY (1977); T. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS (2d ed. 1974); T. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970); T. SZASZ, 
PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). 
2. Burger, Psychiatrists, Lawyers, and the Courts, FED. PROBATION, June 1964, at 7. 
3. See, e.g., Kaplan, An Academic Lawyer Plays Armchair Analyst: Some Speculations 011 
the Relevance of Psychoanalysis lo the Law, 46 NEB. L. REV. 759, 797 (1967). 
4. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumptio11 of Expertise: Flippi11g Coi11s i11 1/1e 
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 752 (1974). 
5. Id. at 728-29. 
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Bromberg hints that these concerns are unwarranted because the 
adversary system adequately screens psychiatric evidence. He rejects 
the much-debated proposal that psychiatric testimony should be pro-
vided by impartial court-appointed examiners. Although psychia-
trists are frequently uncomfortable with the adversary process 
because opposing counsel attack their credibility and because legal 
rules limit their ability to qualify testimony, Bromberg believes the 
inherent subjectivity of much psychiatric testimony necessitates 
cross-examination and rebuttal. This reliance on the adversary sys-
tem is disquieting, for it suggests that Bromberg's enthusiasm for ex-
tensive use of psychiatry in legal proceedings is based as much on an 
unenunciated belief in the genius of the legal system as on his faith 
in psychiatry. Confidence in the legal system may well be war-
ranted, but one would hope that a psychiatrist so smug about his 
profession's role in court would rely more heavily on the strengths of 
his own discipline. 
